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ABSTRACT             JEL  J3, J7 
Using new linked employee-employer data for Britain in 2004, this paper shows that, on average, 
full-time male public sector employees earn 11.7 log wage points more than their private sector 
counterparts. Decomposition analysis reveals that the majority of this pay premium is associated 
with public sector employees having individual characteristics associated with higher pay and to 
their working in higher paid occupations. Further focussing analysis on the highly skilled and 
unskilled occupations in both sectors, reveals evidence of workplace segregation positively 
impacting on earnings in the private sector for the highly skilled, and in the public sector for the 
unskilled. Substantial earnings gaps between the highly skilled and unskilled are found, and the 
unexplained components in these gaps are very similar regardless of sector.  
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1.  Introduction 
The public sector is a huge source of employment in the UK: employing a fifth of the total U.K. 
workforce. The corresponding wage bill contributes to nearly 50% of government spending in 2007. 
The public sector pay bill is, however, far from stable over time. Trinder (1997) argues that there are 
large oscillations in the public sector pay bill and that the movements in private/public wage 
relativities are pro-cyclical in Britain. During the 1980s and 1990s changes in the occupational 
composition across sectors led to a decline in the public sector pay gap, especially so for men1. Once 
they allow for changes in the age and qualifications of the workforces over time, Disney and Gosling 
(1998; page 354) report a public sector pay gap for men of only 1% in the 1990s.   
Elliot et al. (1999) investigate public/private sector wages in the five largest EU states and 
Sweden. They also conclude that it is vital to allow fully for different returns to occupation, 
however, they note that a major difficulty is in identifying occupations where both private and public 
sector employees are present in large numbers. Studies which divide the sample (in some way) 
between high and low salaried employees could expect to find a positive pay premium for low 
earners in the public sector, especially if males and females are considered together and if 
occupations are not fully allowed for. Luciflora and Meurs (2006) compare the public sector pay gap 
across, Britain, France and Italy. They also conclude that the pay gap is highest for low salary 
earners in the public sector and argue that differences in unobserved characteristics may be more 
important for these employees2. It is clearly important to be able to control for the characteristics of 
potentially very diverse labour forces in the two sectors. 
Another major difference between the public and private sectors in Britain is the nature of the 
wage setting process. For example, there are considerable disparities in the extent of trade union 
representation in wage negotiations, the presence of wage setting boards in the public sector, and the 
presence of incentive pay schemes across the sectors. Makepeace and Marcenaro-Gutierrez (2006; 
page 6) argue that, with the exception of the armed forces, all the public sector occupations covered 
by pay review bodies saw a growth in their real earnings between 1999 and 2003.  
Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) use the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS90) 
to explore incentive schemes across public and private sector workplaces. Controlling for 
occupational type they find that incentive schemes are much rarer for higher skilled occupations in 
the public sector. Burgess and Ratto (2003) survey international evidence to further explore the 
 
1 Bender and Elliot (1999) also investigate pay convergence across the public and private sectors in Britain. Their main 
conclusion (using the usual decomposition analysis) is of divergence between returns to sector-specific occupational 
characteristics. 
2 Yu et al (2005) similarly find salaries are greater for well paid employees in the private sector and vice versa for the 
lowly paid in the public sector in Britain. They only include years of schooling, work experience and an indicator 
variable for public sector employment as explanatory variables. 
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impact of explicit incentives (and especially Performance Review Pay, PRP) in the public sector. 
They conclude that these practices are typically under utilised in the public sector. A strength of 
these studies is the recognition that workplace characteristics are not uniform across the sectors. To 
be able to fully consider the association between payment schemes such as these and the resultant 
public sector pay gap for individual employees, it is necessary to use linked employee and workplace 
data.  
The data used in this paper are drawn from the British Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey 2004 (WERS04)3 which is a nationally representative survey of both workplaces and their 
employees. The linked nature of the WERS04 data allows us to control far more extensively for both 
individual employee characteristics and the workplace than has been possible in previous earnings 
studies. A further attractive feature of the WERS04 data, of particular relevance to our study, is the 
extensive information it provides on both public and private sector workplaces (Kersley et al, 2006, 
page 5).  
Most studies that concentrate on the public-private wage differential issue rely on the human 
capital model as the theoretical basis for the study of earnings (Becker 1975).  This approach is also 
used as the starting point in this paper. At the employee level, it is assumed that wages increase with 
(marginal) productivity which in turn increases with measures of accumulated skills such as 
education, work experience, and training. The Human Capital approach is necessarily partial. By 
using linked workplace-worker data, we are able to explore the additional role the workplace may 
have in the wage determination process and on the public-private wage differential in Britain.  In 
doing so, we will investigate the relative earnings of (1) male public sector and private sector full-
time male employees, and (2) male full-time employees4 in the highly skilled (managerial, 
professional and technical) and unskilled occupations in each of these sectors. A further contribution 
of our study over the existing literature is to also consider the potential impact of the workplace on 
the public-private sector pay gap.  
 
 
 
 
 
3Department of Trade and Industry  (2006). Workplace Employee Relations Survey: Cross-Section, 2004 (computer 
file). 5th ed. Colchester: The Data Archive (distributor). SN: 5294.  
4 Nickel and Quintini (2002), using evidence from age 10 and 11 test scores from the National Child Development 
Survey (NCDS) and the NES, argue that a decline in public relative to private sector pay adversely affects the quality of 
males in the public sector, but not females. Their paper emphasises the need to control fully for the individual 
characteristics of public sector employees, but also raises the question of why the different genders may respond 
differently to the characteristics of public sector workplaces. This paper will concentrate on males working full-time. 
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 2. The Data 
The British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004 (WERS04) is a nationally representative 
survey of workplaces with 5 or more employees5. (A workplace comprises the activities of a single 
employer at a single set of premises.) Face-to-face interviews for WERS2004 were conducted with a 
senior manager (with day-to-day responsibility for employee relations). At those workplaces 
responding to the manager survey, a questionnaire was presented to 25 randomly selected employees 
(in workplaces with more than 5 employees) or to all the employees (in workplaces with fewer than 
26 employees). The entire surveying process resulted in 2,295 completed workplace surveys, with 
22,451 completed employee questionnaires from 1,733 of these workplaces. Concentrating on male 
full-time employees leaves us data for 6,695 employees (1,489 from the public sector and 5,206 
from the private).  
 WERS04 is a stratified random sample, and larger workplaces and some industries are over-
represented.  Thus, all of the empirical results that follow use workplace and employee sampling 
weights where possible.  
 WERS04 and its predecessors have been used to analyze diverse research questions 
(Millward et al. 2004), but we are not aware of any research using these data to explicitly examine 
the earnings gap between highly skilled and unskilled, public sector and private sector, male full-
time employees in Britain. Retaining only those individuals who have complete information for the 
variables used in the analyses below leaves us 6,695 full-time male employees (1,489 from the 
public sector and 5,206 from the private sector). 
 
3.  Measuring the earnings gap  
Full definitions of the variables to be used in the study are presented in Appendix Table A1. Brief 
sample based summary statistics are presented in Table 1 for the full data sample (columns one and 
two), the public sector (columns three and four), and the private sector employees (columns five and 
six).  We concentrate on male full-time employees only. 6 A full-time employee is defined to be 
working 37 or more hours per week, which is a standard full-time working week in the public sector 
and a reasonable assumption for the more variable definition of full-time in the private sector 
(Manning and Petrongolo, 2006).  
 In the latter sections of this paper, we aggregate the three upper occupational categories by 
skill, namely managerial, professional and technical, into one highly skilled (high flying) category 
which we call “Highly Skilled”. For contrast, we also focus on the occupational group of 
 
5 The industries excluded from the survey were agriculture, hunting and forestry; fishing; mining and quarrying; private 
households with employed persons; and extra-territorial organisations and bodies. 
6 For a study of gender earnings gaps across the public and private sectors in Britain, see Chatterji et al, 2007. 
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“Unskilled” workers. Table 1 also presents summary statistics for the Highly Skilled (columns seven 
and eight) and for the Unskilled employees (columns nine and ten), respectively. The public sector 
(as defined by the suppliers of the data set7) employs 22 per cent of full-time male employees in 
Britain (Table 1): 28 per cent of the Highly Skilled group and 26 per cent of the Unskilled. In other 
words, there is some over representation, in the public sector, at both ends of the occupational 
spectrum.  
The variable of major interest is the hourly wage variable W for employee i  in workplace j. 
Hourly earnings are calculated for each employee by dividing their gross (before tax and other 
deductions) weekly wages by the hours they usually work each week (including any overtime and 
extra hours). The data do not give the actual value of gross weekly wages but rather the interval to 
which the wage belongs for each sampled worker, there are 14 bands. In our regression analysis, the 
mid-point of the interval is used as the measure of weekly wages.8 Usual hours worked is a 
continuous measure. The subsequent hourly wage measure, Wij, is the ratio of weekly wages to usual 
hours and is therefore continuous. 
We find that public sector full-time males earn some 8.9% more than do their private sector 
employees (Table 1, row one) and that there is considerably more variance in public than in private 
sector pay. Comparing log wages, as is more common in the literature, public sector employees earn 
11.7 log wage points (lwp or 11.7 log per cent) more than private sector employees. This is the raw 
earnings gap that will be explored further.  
 
3.1 The determinants of earnings 
As discussed above, the majority of authors have adopted the human capital model as the theoretical 
basis for the earnings function in both the private and the public sector (an extensive recent survey is 
provided in Chiswick, 2003). This approach is also used in this paper. At the employee level, it is 
assumed that wages increase with measures of accumulated skills such as education, work 
experience, and training.   
 
7 A public sector workplace is one where the best description of the formal status of the establishment (or the 
organisation of which it is a part) is that it is a: government owned limited company; nationalised industry; public service 
agency; other non-trading public corporation; quasi autonomous national government organisation (QUANGO); or 
local/central government (including the National Health Service and Local Education Authorities).   
A private sector workplace is one where the best description of the formal status of the establishment (or the organisation 
of which it is a part) is that it is a:  public limited company (PLC); private limited company; company limited by 
guarantee; partnership (including limited liability partnership/ self-proprietorship.); trust/charity; body established by 
Royal Charter; or co-operative/mutual/friendly society. 
8In unreported results, we address the possibility that this banding may affect our results (Stewart, 1983). Using interval 
regression techniques, we find, however, no significant difference from the more general OLS regression results reported 
in the text. 
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 WERS04 provides information as to the highest level of education the individual has 
received across a range of educational categories. Just over a quarter of full-time male employees 
have a degree or postgraduate qualification whilst nearly 60 per cent have no post-age 16 
qualifications (Table 1).  Measures of work experience are usually assumed to be positively related 
to wages via the ability to become more productive over the time period the employee has spent 
working. Typically, cross-sectional studies do not have data on the history of actual lifetime work 
experience across firms for individuals. Instead proxies are provided, the most common of which is 
potential experience: the age of the individual minus years spent in education. This may lead to an 
underestimate of the relationship between work experience and earnings if the individual was not 
employed consistently throughout their working life (such as the long-term unemployed or mothers 
who have taken time out of the labour force to care for their children9). WERS04 also does not have 
information on actual experience over working life; potential experience (age minus education and 
infant years) is used instead and the results need to be interpreted with this caveat in mind. The 
length of the time the employee spent in employer-provided training in the previous year (sometimes 
thought of as Continuous Professional Development, CPD) is also included in the dataset; this 
measure of training is expected to be positively related to wages (Hashimoto, 1981; Almeida-Santos 
and Mumford, 2005). 
 The public sector sample displays higher levels for all of these categories (35.5% have a 
degree or postgraduate qualification compared to 24.7% of the private sector employees; they have 
on average 2.3 more years of experience and 1.2 days more training in the previous year; they are 
also almost 9% more likely to have a vocational qualification, see Table 1). Public sector employees 
are much more likely to be in the professional, technical, clerical and personal services occupations 
whilst the private sector has more managers, craftsmen, salesmen, and operative-assembly workers.  
 The earnings function is augmented with the inclusion of further categories of explanatory 
variables capturing individual employee characteristics such as demographic variables (which may 
constrain an individual’s choice of jobs such as the presence of dependent children, marital status, 
race and physical disability); job characteristics (being on a fixed term contract, current job tenure, 
and union membership); and workplace-specific characteristics (we allow the workplace to have a 
fixed-effect impact on the productivity of individual employees and thus on the earnings function). 
 Considering the demographic variables in more detail, just over forty per cent of British full-
time male employees have at least one dependent child (see Table 1), this is more common amongst 
the Highly Skilled (45 per cent) than the Unskilled (38 per cent). Close to two thirds of employees 
 
9 By concentrating on full-time male employees this particular possible source of bias may not be as important to the 
results presented here. 
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are partnered or married (again more so for the Highly Skilled, 76 per cent, than the Unskilled, 62 
per cent). There are more employees who consider themselves to be of a non-white ethnic 
background working in the private sector (6 per cent) than the public sector employees (4 per cent); 
and amongst the Unskilled (8 per cent) than the Highly Skilled (4 per cent). Finally, a substantial 
proportion of the workforce has an ongoing physical disability (12 per cent of all full-time men); 
more so in the public sector and amongst the Unskilled. 
 Considering the individual job characteristics, some 2 per cent of employees are working on 
fixed term contracts, reflecting a more insecure employment future. These employment contracts are 
more common in the public sector (3 per cent) than in the private sector (2 per cent) but their 
incidence is not significantly different across the skill groups. Current job tenure (uncompleted 
spells) is on average 5.5 years (5.6 for the Highly Skilled and 5.1 for the Unskilled). Tenure is also 
higher in the public sector (6.3 per cent) than in the private sector (5.3 per cent). Current job tenure 
is expected to be positively related to wages primarily because it usually reflects a successful match 
between employee and employer (Mumford and Smith, 2004) and a greater opportunity to 
accumulate job related skills.  
 Union membership has declined dramatically in Britain since the 1970s. Nevertheless, in 
2004 it was still substantial at 32 per cent of full-time male employees representing a potentially 
major source of bargaining. Union membership rates are very much higher in the public sector (74 
per cent) than in the private sector (23 per cent). They are also higher for the Unskilled (36 per cent) 
than the Highly Skilled (27 per cent). The union may provide a voice mechanism for the individual 
thereby leading to less quits, longer tenure and higher wages (Freeman and Medoff, 1984, Chatterji 
2007). Unions may also, however, provide a range of other services to their members, which could 
increase relative job satisfaction and reduce the wage. On balance, a positive relationship between 
union membership status and the wage is expected. 
 Occupational choice, at an individual level, is often treated in much the same way as 
educational outcome since they both reflect a range of variables, especially individual ability and 
opportunity (Filer, 1986). Occupational choice may also be constrained. In general, those 
occupations typically associated with higher skill levels are more likely to occur in the public sector 
(professional, technical). With the exception of the Highly Skilled managers, who are more likely to 
be employed in the private sector. Analogously, the more manual skilled occupations (crafts, 
personal services, sales, operative and assembly workers) are more likely to be employed in the 
private sector (Table 1). The proportion of the male full-time workforce that is classified as 
Unskilled is 13 log percent, this is slightly higher in the public sector (at 14 per cent) than in the 
private sector (13 per cent), but not significantly so. As discussed above, in the second stage of the 
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analysis below, we combine managerial, professional and technical employees into a single group 
which we call the Highly Skilled. We compare this group to those employees who are Unskilled. 
 
4.  Estimating the earnings function 
We start by establishing a base line regression which uses individual worker characteristics only. For 
clarity we focus on earnings outcomes for full-time males, not least because the impact of gender 
may well be conflated with the issue of workplace-specific effects. Using semi-logarithmic wage 
equations, we estimate: 
 εββα ijijkijij kX+X+=W ++ )(...)1(1      (1)   
where WBiiB is the natural log of the wage for individual i in workplace j;  α is an intercept term;  XBijB is 
a vector of k regressors capturing the individual characteristics expected to have an impact on wages; 
and ε ij  is a residual term. We call this our baseline model and estimate it using ordinary least. 
Having established the baseline, we then allow for workplace-specific fixed effects by re-
estimating (1) using a fixed effects model:  
εββα ijijkijjij kX+X+=W ++∂+ )(...)1(1      (2) 
where j again represents the workplace and δBj B the workplace-specific effectTP10 PT.  
 We begin with an analysis of male public sector and private sector full-time male employees. 
This is followed with an investigation of the relative earnings of male full-time employees in the 
highly skilled (managerial, professional and technical) and unskilled occupations in each of these 
sectors (see section 7 below). We estimate models separately for each of the groups of employees, 
rather than pooling models across employees (see Bayard et al, 2003, for example). We take the 
view that models for public sector and private sector employees may be more likely to produce 
different parameters than those for all employees. This is borne out in the results shown below. 
 Robustness of the estimation results is of clear concern. The nature of the earnings data in 
WERS04 presents an issue for the construction of the earnings series employed in this paper. As 
noted above, the earnings data in WERS04 is not measured in a continuous manner but is instead 
banded. As Stewart (1983) discusses, it is possible, in principle, that this banding may affect the 
properties of the ordinary least squares estimates of the earnings function that we estimate. In 
unreported results (available from the authors) we provide a full set of estimates employing the 
appropriate (and suitably weighted) interval regression method. Comparison of the estimates 
                                                 
TP
10
PT The workplace-specific effect δBjB also captures unobservable individual effects common to all employees in a 
workplace. It is not possible to identify the remaining idiosyncratic effects and we relegate them to the residual. This will 
have no consequence for the estimate of δBjB if the remaining individual effects are uncorrelated with these included 
workplace-specific effects. 
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confirms that interval estimates are very similar to the ordinary least squares estimates. We therefore 
concentrate our analysis on the ordinary least squares estimates11. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
Table 2 reports the baseline estimates of our earnings function in columns 2 and 3 and the estimates 
including workplace specific fixed effects in columns 4 and 5. The test of the explanatory power of 
the regressors is clearly significant for all the regressions. Overall, the parameter estimates are 
generally well defined and have the expected sign. 
 Beginning with the baseline regressions, the returns from higher qualifications are positive 
for all employees and they are higher in the private sector than in the public sector. It should be 
remembered that these statements are relative in nature. For example, the returns to education in 
each sector are measured relative to the omitted education category; in this case, “education none or 
other” (which we treat as our base). The average log hourly pay for this education level is 1.99 lwp  
in the private sector and 2.08 lwp in the public. They constitute 27.7 per cent of the private sector 
workforce and 21.7 per cent of the public. As the comparison group is lower paid in the private 
sector we might expect to see larger rates of return for higher education levels in this sector. The 
returns from extra days of training and vocational qualifications are also positive for all employees 
but are only significantly related to wage increase in the private sector.  
The returns from potential work experience are a little more complex to interpret as there is 
evidence that the relationship is not a simple linear one. The returns are increasing (as indicated by 
the positive coefficients in row 1 of Table 2) but at a decreasing rate (the negative coefficients for 
potential experience squared in row 2 of Table 2). Thus, the total returns associated with potential 
work experience are not constant for difference lengths of experience. Returns in the private sector 
are higher for all but the very longest periods of work experience. (At experience levels less than 44 
years, the total returns from experience are higher in the private sector and at experience levels more 
than 44 years they are higher in the public sector.) Total returns from experience in the private sector 
are increasing up to 33 years of experience, after which the marginal returns associated with an extra 
year of experience becomes negative. The relationship between experience and returns in the public 
sector in relatively smoother; the marginal returns associated with an extra year of experience only 
becomes negative at 42 years of experience.  The difference in the returns from experience across 
 
11 A further issue concerns unobservable heterogeneity in true worker quality. Nickel and Quintini (2002), using 
evidence from age 10 and 11 test scores from the National Child Development Survey (NCDS) and the New Earnings 
Survey (NES), argue that a decline in public sector relative to private sector pay adversely affects the quality of males in 
the public sector, but not females. Their paper emphasises the need to control fully for the individual characteristics of 
public sector employees, but also raises the question of why the different genders may respond differently to the 
characteristics of public sector workplaces. 
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the sectors is highest at 22 years of experience, the gap then closes until the curves cross at 44 years. 
The average experience in these two sectors is 26 years in the public sector and 24 in the private (see 
Table 1): where the gap in returns is close to the widest.  
The returns from being in the more skilled occupations (managerial, professional and 
technical) rather than clerical are all higher in the public sector. The average log hourly pay for 
clerks is 2.17 lwp  in the public sector and 2.26 lwp in the private and so we might expect to see 
higher returns for better paid occupations in the public sector. In the private sector there is a clear 
break in the return to occupation with craft, personal services, salesmen, operative and assembly 
workers and the unskilled earning less than clerks.  The (almost) monotonic decline in the rates of 
return to the occupational categories used suggests a clear occupational hierarchy. In analysis below, 
we exploit this hierarchy by looking at both extremes separately. 
There is no significant difference in the returns to being married across the two sectors, with 
all full-time men enjoying higher wages if they are married. Public sector men earn significantly 
more if they have a child, however. There are also two more significant wages associations in the 
private sector that are not apparent in the public: members of ethnic minorities earn less and trade 
union members earn more. 
Employees from ethnic minorities earn more than others in the public sector (although with 
low significance levels) and substantially less than others in the private sector. Being a trade union 
member is not associated with significantly higher earnings in the public sector (despite the high 
membership rates recorded in this sector) but is associated with 5.5% higher earnings in the private 
sector.  
The introduction of workplace specific fixed effects (columns 5 to 8 of Table 2), though 
statistically significant, has little impact on the public sector results pertaining to the relationship 
between earnings and the augmented human capital regressors. There is some reduction in the 
returns from low levels of education but the return for higher qualifications (degree and 
postgraduate) show relatively little change. The relationship with the demographic characteristics of 
the workers (having a child, being married or being disabled) and the wage also show no significant 
change.  There is some slight decline in the wage returns for the highest occupations in the public 
sector but again not significantly so. These results suggest that there is very little workplace 
segregation amongst public servants or, alternatively, that the introduction of workplace specific 
characteristics does not have an impact on the relationship between the individual characteristics of 
the workers and their wages in the public sector in aggregate. There is one major exception; the 
wage premium enjoyed by those considering themselves to be ethnic is no longer significant, 
suggesting that these employees are concentrated in high paying workplaces. 
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 By contrast, introducing workplace-specific fixed effects into the private sector earnings 
function is associated with a removal of the positive relationship between training and wages; the 
positive returns from higher education levels are reduced; and the union wage gap becomes 
significantly negative.  The earnings penalty associated with being unskilled has also fallen 
substantially. These results suggest that there is segregation of high paid workers into high paying 
workplaces, segregation of low paid workers into low paying workplaces, in the private sector.  
The change in the impact of union membership is particularly striking. Being a trade union 
member is not associated with significantly higher earnings in the public sector in our results 
(despite the high membership rates recorded in this sector) with or without workplace specific 
effects. In the private sector, without the inclusion of workplace specific effect trade union 
membership status is associated with 5.5% higher earnings in the private sector. Once workplace 
specific fixed effects have been fully allowed for, trade union membership is actually associated 
with 4.7% lower earnings in the private sector. This would suggest that the wage premium 
associated with trade unionism in the private sector is linked to being in a ‘unionised’ workplace 
rather than the individual employee themself being a member.   
Another noteworthy finding is that the returns to the lower and higher levels of education 
(especially for postgraduates) are smaller in the private sector than the in public sector once 
workplace fixed effects are allowed for, as are the returns to a vocational qualification.  We will 
return to explore these findings more fully below where the role of occupation is addressed further. 
 
6. Decomposing the earnings gaps across the sectors. 
The estimates we have for the public and private sector employees can be used to examine the 
contribution of individual and other characteristics to making up the explained and unexplained 
portions of the earnings gap. The approach we adopt to apportion the gap in the mean earnings of 
any two groups is that discussed in Oaxaca and Ransom (1994).  In general, the decomposition of 
the mean earnings gap between groups of employees a and b is calculated from estimates of equation 
(1) as: 
 
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)( bababababa XXXWW ααβββ −+−+−=−    (3) 
 
where, in terms of equation (1):  )( ija WW =  and  )( ija XX =  for the subset of i included in group a, and 
)( ijWbW =  and  )( ijb XX =  for the subset of i included in group b. In this calculation 
aba XX βˆ)( − captures the impact of the difference in the value of the regressors weighted by the 
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parameters from the model for group a, and )ˆˆ()
ˆˆ( bababX ααββ −+−  is the remaining unexplained 
gap. In the discussion below, we split the explained component into that part due to the individual 
characteristics and that due to the occupational dummy variables.  
 The decompositions for all full-time male employees across the public and private sectors are 
presented in Table 3.  As discussed above, the earnings gap between public and private sector male 
full-time employees is 11.73 log wage points, lwp (or log per cent). Using the decomposition in 
equation (3), this earnings gap can be decomposed into the component explained by differences in 
the mean values of their individual characteristics of 8.01 log-percentage points (lwp); an 
occupational component of 2.42 lwp; and an unexplained component of 1.29 lwp; the three 
components summing to the earnings gap of 11.73 lwp. Differences in characteristics can be further 
divided into the component related to potential experience (2.28 lwp); differences in formal 
education (4.09 lwp); and other (1.64 lwp). 
 It would seem that the higher hourly earnings public sector full-time males earn over private 
sector males primarily reflect the relatively more productive characteristics the former group 
possesses (especially their formal education and potential work experience) and the higher paid 
occupations they are more likely to be in. There is a relatively small, but notable, unexplained 
component in their earnings gap of 1.29 lwp (or 11 per cent of the total gap). 
 
7.  Focussing on the Highly Skilled and the Unskilled across the sectors. 
The results above reveal that a substantial proportion of the earnings gap between the public and 
private sectors is associated with occupation, confirming the results found by Bender and Elliot 
(1999). In this second part of the paper, we further explore the implications of this finding by 
concentrating analysis on the extreme ends of the occupational categories; the higher skilled and 
lower skilled occupations in the two sectors. As discussed above, we aggregate the three upper 
occupational categories, namely managerial, professional and technical, into one highly skilled 
category which we call “Highly Skilled”. For contrast, we also focus on the occupational group of 
“Unskilled” workers. 
 Table 1 (discussed in section 3 above) presents summary statistics for the full data sample, 
public and private sector, Highly Skilled and Unskilled employees in aggregate, respectively. 
Summary statistics for the sub-samples of primary interest to this second part of the report (public 
sector Highly Skilled, private sector Highly Skilled, public sector Unskilled, and private sector 
Unskilled full-time male employees) are presented in Table 4. This implies four earnings gaps of 
primary concern; these are presented in Figure 1 (measured in log percentage points, lpp, or log 
wage points): 
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Figure 1.  Earnings gaps: Skill and sector.  
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 Within skill levels but across sectors, the public sector to private sector gap for the Highly 
Skilled is only 1 log per cent; this is considerably smaller than the public sector to private sector gap 
for the Unskilled which is 14 log per cent. Within sectors but across skill levels, the earnings gaps 
are considerable: the Highly Skilled public sector to Unskilled public sector gap is 61.2 log per cent, 
whilst the Highly Skilled private sector to Unskilled private sector gap is 74.2 log per cent.12
 
7.1 Within sector differences in characteristics across the skill groups of employees. 
Considering sector differences within skill group (Table 4), the more general sector based 
relationships discussed above (in section 3) are still typically true. For example, public sector 
employees have more potential experience ceteris paribus, as do the Highly Skilled. They are more 
likely to have a higher education levels, recent training, vocational qualifications, a dependent child, 
be married, and so on. In the case of education, the category ce2ae – (two or more A levels at A-E 
standard)  appears to be of particular importance. For the Highly Skilled Group, the proportion of 
workers who have this or higher education level is 61% in the public sector and 56% in the private 
sector. For those in Unskilled Group, the corresponding numbers are 14% and 13% respectively. 
Looking across the public-private divide, these data suggest a greater uniformity amongst the 
Unskilled Group than in the Highly Skilled Group in terms of educational achievements. 
                                                 
12 Two further bilateral gaps, not included in Figure 2, are those between Highly Skilled public sector and Unskilled 
private sector employees (which is 75.1 log per cent); and that between the Highly Skilled private sector and the 
Unskilled public sector employees (which is 60.5 log per cent).  See row 1 of Table 4.  
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 Being disabled is more common in the public sector and amongst the Unskilled. Union 
membership can now also be seen to be consistently higher for public sector and for Unskilled 
employees. Only 14 per cent of Highly Skilled employees in the private sector have current union 
membership. In contrast, 82 per cent of Unskilled employees in the public sector are union members. 
 Amongst those mean characteristics that reveal differences within skill level and sector is the 
ethnic mix, on average 4 per cent of all public sector employees consider themselves to be from an 
ethnic background: 5 per cent of the Highly Skilled and 3 per cent of the Unskilled. In the private 
sector 6 per cent of all employees report that they are from an ethnic background: 4 per cent of the 
Highly Skilled and a substantial 9.5 per cent of the Unskilled. Similarly, Highly Skilled employees 
in the public sector are twice as likely to be employed on a fixed term contract than are Highly 
Skilled employees in the private sector. This pattern is reversed for the Unskilled, where these 
employment contracts are more than three more likely to occur in the private sector. Analogously, in 
the public sector the Unskilled have the longest average current job tenure, in the private sector it is 
the Highly Skilled. 
 
7.2  Estimation across skills and sectors 
We repeat the estimation procedure discussed in section 5 above, however, the focus is now on the 
relative earnings of male full-time employees in the Highly skilled (managerial, professional and 
technical) and Unskilled occupations in each of these sectors. In particular, semi-logarithmic wage 
equations (equation 1 above) are estimated for public sector Highly Skilled, private sector Highly 
Skilled, public sector Unskilled, and private sector Unskilled male full-time employees. Semi-
logarithmic wage equations are also estimated including workplace-specific fixed effects (equation 2 
above) for each of the four groups of employees. We again estimate models separately for each of 
the groups of employees, rather than pooling models across employees. 13
 
7.3 Results for the Highly Skilled and the Unskilled across the sectors. 
The estimates of the earnings function for each of the four groups of employees are presented in 
Tables 5 and 6. These are the OLS (baseline) estimates for public sector Highly Skilled, private 
sector Highly Skilled, public sector Unskilled, and private sector Unskilled male full-time 
employees. Results for the estimates of the semi-logarithmic wage equations (equation 1 above) are 
presented in Table 5. Results for the estimates including for workplace-specific fixed effects 
(equation 2 above) are provided in Table 6.  
 
13 Interval regression estimates again confirm that the OLS estimates are not significantly affected by the banding of the 
earnings data. 
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 Reading across the columns in Table 5, stronger relationships between the explanatory 
variables included in the earnings functions can generally be seen to occur for the Highly Skilled. 
For example, the returns from education are greater for the Highly Skilled across sectors, more so in 
the private sector than in the public. In contrast, there is no significant evidence of the more educated 
Unskilled employees earning more in either sector; instead, it would appear that those Unskilled 
employees who are in the middle of the education distribution do best (given the characteristics 
included in this analysis).  
 There is no significant evidence of higher earnings being associated with recent training in 
the public sector, unlike in the private sector where a relatively small impact is found for both 
Highly Skilled and Unskilled employees. Vocational qualifications are also only significantly related 
to earnings in the private sector but only for Unskilled employees. 
 Differences do occur, however, across the skill groups and/or sectors, a good example of this 
is the relationship between potential work experience and earnings. As discussed above when 
considering sector differences, the returns from potential work experience are non-linear. The returns 
are increasing (as indicated by the positive coefficients in row 1 of Table 5) but at a decreasing rate 
(as indicated by the negative coefficients for potential experience squared in row 2 of Table 5); this 
is true for each skill group and sector. The returns to experience are consistently found to be the 
lower for Unskilled employees in the private sector (peaking at 31 years) 14. In contrast, the returns 
from experience are always higher for the High Skill employees in the private sector (peaking at 36 
years). Within these two extremes lay the returns profiles for the public sector.  
 The returns from experience for High Skill public sector employees also always sit above 
those of the Unskilled public sector employees; however, these profiles are much closer together and 
are much flatter than they are in the private sector. This latter is especially true for the High Skill 
employees. At the point of greatest difference, however, High Skill employees in the private sector 
have returns from work experience that are some 39% greater than their High Skill counterparts in 
the public sector. When they have 40 years of work experience this difference has dropped to 23% 
(and is 15% at 45 years). This result is of some policy importance given the concerns about 
experience based pay scales which are prevalent in the public sector. Our results suggest that 
notwithstanding the absence of formal experience based pay progression, private sector High Skill 
employees are even more greatly rewarded for experience than their public sector counterparts. 
 
14 As discussed above, we might expect the returns from experience to be biased downwards as the measure of work 
experience used here is likely to overestimate the time actually spent in employment over the working life (for example, 
by ignoring spells of unemployment). This may be more relevant for private sector and/or Unskilled employees. 
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 Current job tenure is rewarded similarly for the Highly Skilled in both the public sector and 
private sectors. However, consistent with the findings for work experience, the return for current job 
tenure is much higher for the Unskilled, especially in the private sector. 
 Being on a fixed-term contract has a strong positive relationship with wages for Highly 
Skilled employees in the private sector, it has a strong negative relationship with wages for all of the 
remaining groups of employees (although this is only weakly significant for the Unskilled in the 
private sector). Current union membership is only related to higher earnings for the Unskilled in the 
private sector, where it has a comparatively strong impact.  
 Of the demographic characteristics, having a dependent child is only associated with higher 
earnings for Highly Skilled men in the public sector. In contrast, being married is linked to higher 
wages for all groups except the Unskilled employees in the private sector. In combination, the 
impact of having a dependent child and being married for a Highly Skilled employee in the public 
sector is similar to the impact associated with being married for a Highly Skilled employee in the 
private sector.  
 Dividing the analysis into differing skill levels leads to quite different results for ethnic 
background and disability. There is no longer a positive association with ethnic salaries in the public 
sector and a negative association in the private sector. Whilst there are no significant relationships 
revealed with ethnicity in Table 5, the direction of the relationships are not consistent within sector 
or across skill group. If there is a relationship, it may be that Highly Skilled ethnic employees earn 
more in the public sector and less in the private sector and vice versa for Unskilled ethnic 
employees. Similarly, results in Table 5 suggest that being disabled is significantly associated with 
lower wages for the Highly Skilled and, at very weak significance levels, may actually be associated 
with higher wages for the Unskilled in the public sector.  
 Including workplace-specific fixed effects in the analysis of the Highly Skilled group of 
employees again has differential impacts. In the private sector the estimated rates of return for higher 
education levels fall (especially at the degree and postgraduate levels, where they are now lower than 
in the public sector, see Table 6). The positive wage returns from training in the private sector also 
decline. These results are consistent with High Skilled employees tending to concentrate in high 
paying workplaces in the private sector. Analogously, the negative relationship between earnings 
and being on a fixed term contract or being disabled are no longer significant, suggesting that 
workers with these characteristics are concentrated in low paying workplaces. Finally, the negative 
relationship revealed between union membership and ethnicity and earnings both strengthen and 
become significant when workplace fixed effects are allowed for.  
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Considering the High Skill group of employees in the public sector, when workplace fixed 
effects are included in the analysis, similar changes are found as for the private sector but to a lesser 
extent.15 Whilst there is some evidence of segregation, the public sector workplaces appear to be 
offering a more homogenous work environment for the Highly Skilled than is the private sector.  
The relationship between being employed on a fixed term contract and earnings is very 
different between the two sectors. Our results suggest that those on fixed term contracts are 
concentrated in low paying workplaces in the private sector and high paying workplaces in the 
public sector. Once workplace characteristics are fully allowed for, however, there is no significant 
relationship between earnings and this type of employment contract for High Skill employees in 
either sector. 
 Finally, considering the relationship between trade union membership and earnings, this can 
now be seen to be significantly different across the sectors. Being a union member, given workplace 
characteristics, is associated with 8% more pay for the Highly Skilled in the public sector and l0% 
less pay for the Highly Skilled in the private sector.  
  Considering the Unskilled employees in the private sector, there is some evidence of a 
decline in the returns associated with higher education levels and longer tenure, indicative of some 
concentration of higher paid unskilled workers into higher paying workplaces. The extent of this 
segregation is considerably lower, however, than for their High Skill colleagues. In the public sector, 
there is no substantial evidence of workplace segregation amongst Unskilled employee: again 
suggesting more homogenous work environments across workplaces in the public sector. 
 The substantially higher earnings associated with being a trade union member for the 
Unskilled employees in the private sector (a premium of 13.5%, see Table 8) is no longer apparent in 
the fixed effects results (Table 6). Indeed, these results suggest that there is no relationship between 
trade union membership and earnings for Unskilled employees in either sector once workplace 
characteristics have been fully allowed for. 16
 
7.4  Decomposing the earnings gaps across skill and sector 
The decomposition results for the analysis for the of occupational skill groups across are presented 
in Figure 2. The central core of the figure lays out the four sub-samples of concern (public sector 
Highly Skilled, private sector Highly Skilled, public sector Unskilled and private sector Unskilled). 
 
15 Similarly, the negative relationship between earnings and being disabled is also no longer significant in the public 
sector, suggesting that workers with these characteristics are concentrated in low paying workplaces in this sector. 
16 Our results suggest that the relationship between earnings and trade union membership differs substantially according 
to the type of employee being considered. This is confirmed by other recent studies of earnings gaps based on analysis of 
the WERS04 data (for example,  Chatterji et al (2007) explore earnings gaps between men and women who are working 
in the public and private sectors; Mumford and Smith (2007) consider male and female, full and part-time earnings 
gaps). 
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Each total bilateral earnings gap is presented next to an arrow indicating the direction of the 
comparison. The contribution of the differences in the individual characteristics is evaluated using 
the parameters from the model for the higher earnings group (a in equation (3)). The unexplained 
component results from differences in the parameters for the two groups evaluated at the mean vales 
of the individual characteristics for the lower wage group (b in equation (3)). 
  The earnings gap between Highly Skilled public sector and Highly Skilled private sector full-
time male employees in Britain can now be see to be very small at 1 log wage points, lwp (or log per 
cent).17  This suggests that Highly Skilled private sector workers earn a modest premium over their 
public sector counterparts when raw earnings gaps are considered. This earnings gap can be 
decomposed into the component explained by differences in the mean values of their measures of 
potential experience which make up a major component of 3.28 lwp; differences in the mean values 
of their formal education which make up 2.51 lwp; differences in the mean values of their other 
characteristics which make up a further 0.99 lwp; and an unexplained component of –5.50 lwp. (This 
unexplained gap in earnings is substantial, especially if it is considered relative to the original gap in 
their raw earnings.) The four components summing to the earnings gap of 1 lwp.  
 The earnings gap between public sector and private sector Highly Skilled  employees is 
therefore due to the former having more productive characteristics (or at least characteristics that are 
more likely to be associated with higher pay) especially potential experience and education. The size 
and sign of the negative unexplained component suggests that Highly Skilled employees in the 
private sector are being relatively over-rewarded for their characteristics: given the distribution of 
characteristics across the sectors the observed earnings gap could be expected to be substantially 
larger than it is. 
 The (within skill but across sector earnings) gap for Unskilled employees in the public and 
private sectors is 13 lwp higher than the gap for Highly Skilled employees across the sectors, at 14 
log per cent. Differences in potential experience explain 3.67 lwp (26%); formal education is 0.72 
lwp (5%); differences in the mean values of their other characteristics are a further 2.04 lwp (15%); 
and the unexplained component is 7.19 lwp (51%). Unskilled employees in the public sector have 
substantially higher earnings (as compared to their private sector counterparts) than would be 
expected given their levels of those characteristics that are commonly included in an earnings 
function. 
 
17 Disney and Gosling (1998, using data from the General Household Survey and the British Household Panel Survey) 
also report a public sector pay gap for men of only 1% in the 1990s once they allow for changes in the age and 
qualifications of the workforces, Disney and Gosling (1998; page 354).   
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 Similar analyses can be carried out for the other bilateral earnings gaps18 presented in Figure 
2. There is a sizeable gap between Highly Skilled and Unskilled employees in the private sector, 
with the Highly Skilled earning 74.2 lwp more. Of this differences in the mean values of their 
measures of potential experience make up the smallest component of -0.177 lwp (or – 0.2%) and 
actually suggests the Highly Skilled should earn less given their relatively lower levels of potential 
experience; differences in the mean values of their formal education make up 18.36 lwp (25%); 
differences in the mean values of their other characteristics are a further 4.4 lwp (6%); and the 
unexplained component is substantial at 51.53 lwp (70%).  
 The decomposition of the gap between Highly Skilled and Unskilled employees in the public 
sector is similar. The Highly Skilled earn 61.2 lwp more. Of this, differences in the mean values of 
their measures of potential experience make up -2.13 lwp (or – 4%) and again suggests the Highly 
Skilled should earn less given their relative potential experience; differences in the mean values of 
their formal education make up 15.49 lwp (25%); differences in the mean values of their other 
characteristics are a further -0.22 lwp (-0.3%); and the unexplained component is even more 
substantial at 48.32 lwp (79%). The Highly Skilled in both sectors have much higher earnings (as 
compared to their respective Unskilled counterparts) than would be expected given the levels of their 
characteristics that are commonly included in an earnings function.  
 In aggregate, across-sector but within-skill comparisons reveal that public sector employees 
are more likely to have individual characteristics associated with higher pay. Highly Skilled public 
sector employees are, however, less likely to work in high paying workplaces. In contrast, Unskilled 
employees in the public sector are more likely to work in higher paying workplaces. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
Public sector employees enjoyed an 11.7 log wage point earnings premium over their private sector 
counterparts in Britain in 2004. Other things equal, higher educated private sector employees receive 
a higher rate of return for education than do their public servants counterparts. In comparing the 
higher end of the occupational hierarchy, the public sector rate of return to moving up the 
occupational hierarchy is clearly higher than for private sector counterparts. Ethnic minority 
employees are also found to earn considerably more in the public sector and considerably less in the 
private sector. 
 
18 Unsurprisingly, given the information in Figure 2, the earnings gap between Highly Skilled public sector and 
Unskilled private sector employees is 75.2 log per cent, differences in the mean values of their: potential experience 
make up 2.42 lwp (or 3%); education characteristics make up 15.69 lwp (21%); other characteristics a further 1.59 lwp 
(2%); and the unexplained component is 55.38 lwp (74%).   
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Introducing workplace specific fixed effects has little impact on the parameters for the public 
sector suggesting that workplace characteristics are not strongly related to the individual 
characteristics that are associated with wages in this sector. With the exception of ethnic employees 
indicating that ethnic public servants are concentrated in high paying workplaces.  
In the private sector there is evidence of high wage workers being concentrated in high wage 
workplaces and vice versa and that this concentration is associated with earnings potential. For 
example, once the workplace specific effects are allowed for, being a union member is associated 
with lower earnings. Similarly, the lower parameters on training and higher education levels may 
indicate some segregation of high wage workers into high productivity workplaces.   
Nevertheless, decomposition analysis shows that the majority of the public sector pay 
premium is associated with public servants being more likely to have individual characteristics 
associated with higher pay and to their working in higher paid occupations. 
Within skill levels but across sectors, the public sector to private sector gap for the Highly 
Skilled is only 1 log per cent; this is clearly considerably smaller than the public sector to private 
sector gap for the Unskilled which is 14 log per cent. Within sectors but across skill levels, the 
earnings gaps are considerable: the Highly Skilled public sector to Unskilled public sector gap is 
61.2 log per cent, whilst the Highly Skilled private sector to Unskilled private sector gap is 74.2 log 
per cent.  
In aggregate, across-sector but within-skill comparisons reveal that public sector employees 
are more likely to have individual characteristics associated with higher pay. Once these (and other 
observable factors which contribute to the wage gap) are taken into account, we find that for the 
Highly Skilled group, private sector employees earn a substantial premium over their public sector 
counterparts. By contrast, for the Unskilled Group, public sector employees earn a considerable 
premium over their private sector counterparts.  
These findings suggest that there is no simple relationship between public sector pay and 
private sector pay. The High skilled receive a premium in the private sector and, at the opposite end, 
Unskilled public sector workers receive a premium over their private sector counterparts. The 
earnings inequality between the Highly Skilled group and the unskilled is however similar in the two 
sectors. In both, the premium for being in the Highly Skilled group compared to the Unskilled group 
is considerable at over 60%. In managing public sector pay, these differences between the opposite 
ends of the occupational hierarchy may need to be borne in mind.  
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Table 1. Sample means. 
  full sample   public sector   private sector  highly skilled  unskilled 
        mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
             
               
              
              
           
              
               
              
               
               
              
               
              
              
              
        
               
  
ln(average hourly pay)
 
2.219 0.01 2.315 0.02 2.198 0.02 2.524 0.01 1.807 0.02
potential experience
 
24.321 0.24 26.223 0.41 23.907 0.27 23.153 0.30 25.603 0.74
training 2.554 0.07 3.564 0.16 2.334 0.07 3.258
 
0.10
 
1.638
 
0.14
 education measures;  
     none 0.274 0.01  0.206 0.01  0.290 0.01  0.108 0.01  0.396 0.02 
     cse25 0.113 0.01  0.088 0.01  0.119 0.01  0.067 0.01  0.156 0.01 
     cse1 0.218 0.01 0.215 0.01 0.219 0.01 0.200 0.01 0.182 0.02
    gceae 0.042 0.00  0.046 0.01  0.042 0.00  0.041 0.05  0.034 0.01 
    gce2ae 0.071 0.00  0.079 0.01  0.069 0.00  0.089 0.01  0.056 0.01 
    degree 0.197 0.01  0.241 0.02  0.188 0.01  0.343 0.01  0.064 0.01 
    postgraduate 0.069 0.01  0.114 0.01  0.059 0.01  0.142 0.01  0.013 0.01 
vocational qual.
 
0.598 0.01 0.670 0.02 0.582 0.01 0.653 0.01 0.426 0.02
child 0.419 0.01 0.452 0.02 0.412 0.01 0.451 0.01 0.375 0.02
married 0.705 0.01 0.754 0.01 0.695 0.01 0.755 0.01 0.619 0.02
disabled 0.123 0.00 0.137 0.01 0.120 0.01 0.112 0.01 0.127 0.01
ethnic 0.055 0.01 0.043 0.01 0.058 0.01 0.042 0.01 0.083 0.02
fixed term
 
0.024 0.00 0.034 0.01 0.022 0.00 0.029 0.004 0.025 0.01
tenure
 
5.512 0.08 6.340 0.16 5.331 0.09 5.560 0.11 5.095 0.22
union 0.320 0.01 0.736 0.02 0.229 0.01 0.273 0.01 0.362 0.03
occupation categories;  
     managerial  0.160 0.01  0.115 0.01  0.169 0.01   x    
     professional 0.115 0.01  0.161 0.02  0.105 0.01   x    
     technical 0.133 0.01  0.241 0.02  0.110 0.01   x    
     clerical 0.074 0.00  0.123 0.02  0.064 0.00       
     craft  0.160 0.01  0.095 0.02  0.174 0.01       
     personal  0.022 0.00  0.061 0.01  0.014 0.00       
     sales  0.037 0.00  0.006 0.00  0.044 0.01       
     operative  0.165 0.01  0.055 0.01  0.189 0.01       
     unskilled 
 
0.134 
 
0.01 
 
 0.143 
 
0.02 
 
 0.132 
 
0.01 
 
     x 
No. observations 6695 1489 5206 2900 862
Source: WERS 2004. 
 
 
24
Table 2. Baseline and FE regressions: public and private sector full-time males. 
 Baseline OLS  With workplace specific effects  
ln(hourly pay) 
 
public sector 
 
 private sector 
 
 public sector 
 
 private sector 
 
 
coeff t-value        coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
potential experience (years) 0.018 5.14 *** 0.027 12.03 *** 0.013 3.78 *** 0.022 10.29 *** 
potential experience sqd. (x103)             
     
            
           
           
             
          
            
           
            
          
      
            
     
        
-0.217 -3.11 *** -0.419 -9.56 *** -0.167 -2.45 *** -0.341 -8.55 ***
training (days previous year) 0.002 0.58  0.006 
 
2.64 
 
*** 0.004 
 
1.12 
 
 0.000 
 
-0.08 
 
 
education none is omitted
     cse25 0.114 3.33 *** 0.077 4.02 *** 0.062 1.80 * 0.061 3.44 *** 
     cse1 0.139 5.99 *** 0.114 5.88 *** 0.109 4.01 *** 0.074 4.41 ***
    gceae 0.094 1.19  0.126 3.89 *** 0.059 1.12  0.115 4.74 *** 
    gce2ae 0.229 6.91 *** 0.256 9.71 *** 0.148 4.49 *** 0.199 8.50 *** 
    degree 0.288 9.61 *** 0.376 14.75 *** 0.233 8.03 *** 0.243 11.76 *** 
    postgraduate 0.491 9.37 *** 
 
0.528 14.46 *** 
 
0.429 7.00 *** 0.338 11.19 *** 
vocational qualification
 
0.031 1.57 0.030 2.19 **
 
0.048 2.54 *** 0.034 3.17 ***
child 0.053 2.63 *** 0.026 1.99 * 0.058 2.60 *** 0.015 1.51
married 0.061 2.80 ***
 
0.077 5.28 ***
 
0.058 2.54 ***
 
0.069 5.56 ***
disabled -0.032 -1.56 -0.025 -1.48 -0.012 -0.54 -0.012 -0.83
ethnic 0.093 1.76 *
 
-0.075 -2.37 ***
 
-0.010 -0.25 -0.059 -2.12 **
fixed term
 
0.058 1.29 -0.100 -1.60 0.024 0.57 -0.111 -1.99 **
tenure
 
0.014 4.71 ***
 
0.012 5.69 *** 0.014 4.45 ***
 
0.011 6.73 ***
union -0.013
 
-0.58 0.055
 
2.86
 
*** 0.008
 
0.32
 
-0.047
 
-2.87
 
***
clerical is omitted
     managerial  0.303 6.01 *** 0.212 6.74 *** 0.295 4.94 *** 0.246 10.06 *** 
     professional 0.227 3.58 *** 0.189 5.58 *** 0.202 2.20 *** 0.128 5.12 *** 
     technical 0.230 4.50 *** 0.095 2.72 *** 0.206 3.73 *** 0.058 2.31 *** 
     craft  0.083 1.71 * -0.084 -2.68 *** 0.076 1.30  -0.028 -1.17  
     personal  -0.083 -1.51  -0.277 -5.38 *** -0.006 -0.08  -0.145 -2.75 *** 
     sales  0.041 0.49  -0.276 -6.27 *** -0.060 -0.68  -0.083 -2.47 *** 
     operative  -0.090 -1.29  -0.223 -6.74 *** -0.209 -2.25 *** -0.157 -6.42 *** 
     unskilled 
 
-0.205 -4.23 *** -0.363 -9.59 *** -0.175 -2.27 *** -0.255 -8.73 *** 
constant
 
1.564
 
29.34 *** 1.579
 
37.15
 
*** 1.654
 
24.06
 
*** 1.700
 
47.40
 
***
No. observations 
 
  
 
1489   
 
 5206    
 
1489    
 
5206  
R-squared 0.5147 0.5149 0.7427 0.7647
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Table 3. Decomposing the earnings gap: Public and Private sector male full-time 
employees.  
 
 
   
Earnings gap  11.73 
   
(i) Baseline OLS   
Differences in characteristics  8.01 lpp 
       Potential experience 2.28 lpp  
       Education 4.09 lpp  
       Other 1.64 lpp  
Occupation  2.42 lpp 
Unexplained  1.29 lpp 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WERS 2004. In each case the contribution of each group of variables is evaluated  
using the parameters from the model for the public sector (the higher earnings group). All  
figures are expressed in log-percentage points.  
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Table 4.  Sub sample means. 
 highly skilled    unskilled
 public sector  private sector  public sector  private sector 
        mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e. mean s.e.
            
            
            
           
     
           
            
           
            
            
           
            
           
            
   
            
ln(hourly pay) 2.532 0.02 2.522 0.02 1.917 0.03 1.781 0.02
potential experience
 
25.454 0.48 22.478 0.36 29.332 0.94 24.721 0.88
training 4.506
 
0.17
 
2.892
 
0.11
 
1.809
 
0.29
 
1.597
 
0.15
 education measures;
     none 0.102 0.01  0.110 0.01  0.457 0.03  0.486 0.03 
     cse25 0.061 0.01  0.069 0.01  0.164 0.03  0.154 0.02 
     cse1 0.181 0.02 0.205 0.01 0.191 0.03 0.180 0.02
    gceae 0.039 0.01  0.041 0.01  0.031 0.01  0.034 0.01 
    gce2ae 0.076 0.01  0.093 0.01  0.094 0.02  0.047 0.01 
    degree 0.341 0.03  0.344 0.01  0.040 0.02  0.070 0.01 
    postgraduate 0.195 0.02  0.127 0.01  0.008 0.01  0.015 0.01 
vocational qualification
 
0.748 0.02 0.625 0.02 0.457 0.04 0.419 0.02
child 0.499 0.02 0.437 0.01 0.401 0.04 0.369 0.02
married 0.799 0.02 0.742 0.01 0.740 0.03 0.591 0.02
disabled 0.126 0.01 0.108 0.01 0.149 0.02 0.122 0.01
ethnic 0.051 0.01 0.039 0.01 0.031 0.01 0.095 0.02
fixed term
 
0.049 0.01 0.024 0.004 0.008 0.01 0.029 0.01
tenure 6.197 0.22 5.373 0.12 6.662 0.34 4.724 0.23
union
 
0.722
 
0.02
 
0.142
 
0.01
 
0.818
 
0.03
 
0.254
 
0.03
 
No. observations 805 2095 222 640
Source: WERS 2004. 
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Table 5. Baseline earnings regressions: By skill groups and sector. 
             
    Highly skilled Unskilled  
 public sector  private sector  public sector  private sector  
log hourly pay              
 coeff            
             
           
        
  
           
           
           
           
          
             
            
         
             
  
           
             
            
     
t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value coeff t-value
potential experience 0.021 3.46 ***
 
0.032 8.19 *** 0.021 2.92 ***
 
0.016 2.61 ***
potential exp sqd (x1000)
 
-0.261 -2.03 **
 
-0.475 -5.79 ***
 
-0.304 -2.01 **
 
-0.268 -2.49 ***
 training -0.004 -1.22
 
0.007
 
2.27
 
** -0.003
 
-0.20
 
0.010
 
1.81
 
*
education none is omitted    
     cse25 0.146 2.36 *** 0.017 0.35  0.070 1.43  0.065 1.36  
     cse1 0.142 3.22 *** 0.059 1.35  0.124 1.91 * 0.135 3.21 *** 
     ceae 0.035 0.22  0.048 0.84  0.037 0.47  -0.052 -0.78  
     ce2ae 0.228 3.98 *** 0.322 7.16 *** 0.228 3.62 *** 0.118 2.37 *** 
    degree 0.294 5.42 *** 0.387 9.19 *** 0.158 1.70 * 0.145 1.98 ** 
    postgraduate 0.466 8.42 *** 
 
0.557 11.77 *** 
 
0.125 0.89  -0.231 -0.84  
vocational qualification
 
-0.009 -0.36 0.011 0.49 0.058 1.43 0.053 1.66 *
 child 0-18
 
0.056 1.96 **
 
0.012 0.55 0.003 0.05 0.010 0.31
married 0.045 1.69 * 0.099 3.74 ***
 
0.060 1.05 0.075 2.28 **
 disabled
 
-0.063 -1.91 *
 
-0.056 -1.69 *
 
0.054 1.47 -0.046 -1.12
ethnic 0.083 1.23 -0.049 -0.93 -0.019 -0.27 0.015 0.23
fixed contract
 
0.098 2.06 ** -0.209 -1.79 * -0.242 -2.31 *** -0.164 -1.64
tenure
 
0.010 2.33 ***
 
0.009 2.97 ***
 
0.017 2.44 ***
 
0.023 4.60 ***
union 0.001 0.02 -0.053 -1.60 -0.056 -0.86 0.135 2.93 ***
constant
 
1.848
 
23.46
 
*** 1.724
 
32.15
 
* 1.399
 
13.28
 
*** 1.339
 
17.37
 
***
  
  
No. observations
  
805 2095 222 640
Pseudo R2
 
0.2601
 
0.2937
 
0.1411
 
0.2533
    
Source: WERS 2004. *** Significant at a confidence level of 99% and/or above, ** at 95% level, and * at 90%. 
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Table 6. Fixed effects earnings regressions: By skill groups and sector. 
              
      Highly Skilled Unskilled
 public sector  private sector  public sector  private sector  
log hourly pay              
 coeff t-value    
         
    
       
   
  
     
    
    
    
    
         
         
          
        
        
      
       
       
        
 
          
     
      
      
coeff t-value  coeff t-value coeff t-value 
potential experience 0.019 3.08 *** 0.031 7.54 *** 0.016 2.34 *** 0.013 1.64
potential exp sqd (x1000) 
 
-0.278 -2.37 *** 
 
-0.467 -5.64 *** 
 
-0.209 -1.73 *
 
-0.220 -1.67 *
 training 0.001 0.19
 
0.004
 
1.15
 
 -0.0004
 
-0.05
 
0.003
 
0.59
 education none is omitted   
     cse25 0.045 0.80  -0.060 -0.99  -0.043 -1.04 -0.010 -0.20 
     cse1 0.127 3.06 *** -0.019 -0.42  0.088 1.65 *
 
0.009 0.19
     ceae 0.023 0.24  0.018 0.34  -0.053 -0.69 -0.022 -0.28 
     ce2ae 0.129 2.38 *** 0.158 3.22 *** 0.144 2.64 ***
 
0.112 2.14 **
     degree 0.232 5.19 *** 0.182 3.98 *** 0.082 1.15 0.080 1.58
    postgraduate 0.356 7.45 *** 
 
0.312 5.84 *** 
 
-0.028 -0.15 -0.078 -0.74 
vocational qualification
 
0.035 1.42 0.020 1.03  0.049 0.91 0.093 2.45 ***
 child 0-18 0.034 1.00 0.032 1.67 * 0.066 1.08 -0.046 -1.43
married 0.079 2.46 *** 0.083 3.12 *** 0.078 1.61 0.037 1.01
disabled -0.014 -0.35  0.003  0.13 0.019 0.54 -0.070 -1.99 **
 ethnic -0.022 -0.36 -0.103 -2.62 *** -0.119 -1.16 -0.016 -0.17
fixed contract 
 
0.018 0.39  -0.099 -0.89  -0.263 -3.18 *** 0.102 1.52
tenure 0.016 3.38 *** 0.012 3.53 *** 0.012 1.99 **
 
0.017 3.41 ***
 union 0.079 **2.31 -0.101 *** -3.19 -0.005 -0.20 -0.087 -1.16
constant
 
1.809
 
24.41
 
 *** 1.882
 
32.32
 
 *** 1.457
 
10.45
 
 *** 1.526
 
16.03
 
 ***
   
   
No. observations  805   2095  222 640
Pseudo R2  
 
 0.7135 
 
  0.7034 
 
 0.6236
 
0.7718
   
Source: WERS 2004. *** Significant at a confidence level of 99% and/or above, ** at 95% level, and * at 90%. 
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Figure 2: Decomposition of the Earnings Gaps - Comparing skilled and unskilled full-time male  
employees in the Public and Private Sectors. 
 
 
Potential 
experience 3.26 lpp         -0.17 lpp 
Potential 
experience 
Education 2.21 lpp       18.36lpp Education 
Other 0.99 lpp    4.40 lpp Other 
Unexplained  - 5.50 lpp  Skilled Private    51.53 lpp Unexplained 
      
  
Skilled Public 
  
 Unskilled Private 
        14.0 lpp 
Potential 
experience 
 
-2.13 lpp   3.67 lpp 
Potential 
experience 
 Education    15.49 lpp  
Unskilled Public 
 0.72 lpp Education 
Other   - 0.22 lpp      2.04 lpp Other 
Unexplained 48.32 pp      7.19 lpp Unexplained 
1.00 lpp 74.2 lpp 
61.2 lpp 
 
 
Notes: 
Source: WERS 2004. Each total bilateral earnings gap is presented next to an arrow indicating the direction of the comparison.  
In each case the contribution of each group of variables is evaluated using the parameters from the model for the higher earnings 
group. All figures are expressed in log-percentage points.  
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Appendix Table A1.     Variable definitions. 
Variable name  Variable definition 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
  
hourly pay  Average pay [midpoints of 14 bands] divided by usual hours worked (including overtime) 
log hourly pay The natural log of average hourly pay 
 
potential experience (years) Age minus (approximate years of schooling plus 5), measured in years. 
training (days in previous year) 
 
Days of training in the previous twelve months 
  
education measures:    
     none  Does not have any of  the academic qualifications listed 
     cse25 
 
Highest level of education is GCSE grades D-G; CSE grades 2-5 SCE; O grades D-; SCE Standard 
grades 4-7. 
     cse1 
 
Highest level of education is GCSE grades A-C; GCE O-level passes; CSE grade 1 SCE; O grades A-C; 
or SCE Standard 1-3 
    gceae  Highest level of education is GCE A-level grades A-E; 1-2 SCE; Higher grades A-C, As levels  
    gce2ae Highest level of education is 2 or more GCE; A-levels grades A-E; 3 or more SCE; or Higher grades A-C  
    degree Highest level of education is a first degree, eg BSc, BA, HND, HNC Ma at first degree level 
    postgraduate Highest level of education is a higher degree, eg MSc, MA, PGCE, PhD 
child  Has a dependent child aged below 18  
married  Married or living with a partner  
disabled  Has a long term (>1 year) illness/disability  
ethnic 
 
Employee considers they are white and black Caribbean; white and black African; white and Asian;  any 
other mixed background; Indian; Pakistani; Bangladeshi; any other Asian background; Caribbean; 
African; any other black background; Chinese; or any other ethnic group. 
fixed term   Employed on a fixed term contract  
hours  Usual hours worked per week (includes over time)  
tenure   Years at this workplace  
union   Employee is a union member  
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Variable name  Variable definition 
 
   
 
 
  
occupation categories;   
     managerial    Managerial 
     professional    Professional 
     technical    Technical 
     clerical    Clerical  
     craft     Craft service 
     personal     Personal service 
     sales     Sales and customer services 
     operative     Operative and assembly workers 
     unskilled    Unskilled  
highly skilled occupations 
 
Managerial, professional or technical occupation. 
  
public sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: government-owned 
limited company / nationalised industry/T); public service agency; other non-trading public 
corporation; quasi autonomous national government organisation (QUANGO); local/central 
government (inc. NHS and Local Education Authorities). 
private sector 
 
The formal status of this establishment (or the organisation) is described as: public limited 
company (plc); private limited company; company limited by guarantee; partnership (inc. limited 
liability partnership/self-prop); trust / charity; body established by royal charter; co-operative / 
mutual / friendly society.  
  
Source: WERS 2004. 
 
 
 
